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Introduction
In 2005 Medicaid will turn 40, a momentous event in the life of the largest
and most complex of all means-tested public entitlement programs.1 Since 1997,
Medicaid has co-existed with the State Children’s Health Insurance Program
(SCHIP), a small program which covers a fraction of the number of Medicaid
enrolled children but whose legislative structure looms large against its muchbeleaguered companion. 2 To the unpracticed eye, SCHIP and Medicaid appear to
be quite similar in design; in reality however, their differences could not be more
profound, and it is in these differences that clear directions for Medicaid’s possible
future become visible.3 It is these differences and their meaning for U.S. child
health policy which are the subject of this article.
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This analysis is an outgrowth of a multi-year, multi-funder4 project whose
aim was to gain an in-depth understanding of state SCHIP implementation, and in
particular, its implications for Medicaid’s extraordinary pediatric coverage design.5
For nearly four decades, Medicaid’s unique coverage rules for children under 21,
coupled with its extensive reach into the low-income population, have set the
program apart from all other forms of health insurance, public or private. Even as
the program has struggled to overcome inadequate provider participation and the
critical health care access problems faced by the poor generally, Medicaid’s effect
on access to pediatric health care has been significant, in no small part because of
the singular nature of its coverage.6 This design has supported not only the provision
of comprehensive pediatric medical care but also the health care component of
the nation’s special education and child welfare systems, both of which serve
disproportionate numbers of low-income children with special health needs.7
Through its sheer reach into the nation’s maternity system (today Medicaid covers
upwards of 40% of all births in many states), the program essentially supports the
national network of services for high-risk pregnant women and newborns.8 In its
long-term support for the children with serious physical and mental disabilities,
Medicaid’s power for pediatric financing has attracted the attention even of
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Presidents, as witnessed by President Reagan’s 1982 intervention to ensure Medicaid
home coverage for a young, respirator dependent Iowa child named Katie Beckett.9
At the same time, the pediatric component of Medicaid has proven to be quite
controversial, triggering demands for reform by Governors and extensive litigation
testing the limits of the legal entitlement.10
SCHIP shares Medicaid’s mission in its coverage of low-income uninsured
children but its coverage, as formulated in federal and state policy, represents a
dramatic departure from Medicaid rules and principles.11 This departure was the
result of a legislative strategy, supported by some of the nation’s best known
children’s advocacy organizations, which culminated in the enactment of a “notMedicaid” pediatric health care financing scheme offering a financially generous
alternative to the Medicaid legal entitlement.12 The strategy was brilliantly successful;
states responded to the lure of good money with few strings attached by rapidly
implementing SCHIP and extending assistance to several million additional
uninsured low-income children ineligible for Medicaid because of state coverage
limits.13
Yet even as this expansion strategy succeeded, it has left many questions in
its wake, not merely because of the aggregate limitations placed on federal SCHIP
funding, which in turn have led to enrollment caps and waiting lists, but also because
of the implications of its program design for children whose health needs exceed
the norm and who are heavily dependent on state health care and social supports.14
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Two groups of children in particular merit focus. The first group consists
of children with moderate to serious physical and mental disabilities, whose health
care needs for both “acute” and “long-term care” services transcend what typically
would be found in a commercial insurance plan. Some of these children are eligible
for Supplemental Security Income on the basis of their severe disability, but the
majority actually qualifies for Medicaid on the basis of low family income.15
The second group consists of low-income infants, toddlers and young
children who face an elevated risk of developmental disability and delay, and whose
health circumstances dictate a cluster of services known in the pediatric literature
as “early intervention.”16 These services consist of a range of physical and mental
health therapies and stimulation services, preventive counseling and supports for
parents and caregivers, and close developmental monitoring by appropriately trained
health care specialists in child development.17 Early intervention is considered by
child health experts to be a preventive health intervention.18 Strictly speaking
however, the early intervention process is not necessarily “treatment” for a
“diagnosed” condition, and the location of the intervention may be in settings that
have both an educational and preventive health mission (e.g., specialized child
development settings).19
As a result, early intervention is a care process which, like long-term care
for chronic conditions, may lie beyond the reach of commercial insurance norms.20

Sara Rosenbaum, Report: Olmstead v. LC: Analysis and Implications for Medicaid Policy 12 (Center for
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16
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We focused our research on these two groups of children, not simply because
of their elevated health care needs, but also because it is in the context of these
needs that Medicaid’s singular coverage design comes into evidence.21 We viewed
state SCHIP implementation – undertaken during an exceptionally strong period
of economic growth and strength – as a natural experiment of sorts, a test of how
states would design health care assistance for lower income children in the absence
of a federal legal entitlement to comprehensive coverage.
This question – namely, what happens when state governments and health
care markets are freed from the structural constraints of Medicaid – is a critical one
in national health policy. As one of Medicaid’s best analysts has observed, the
program has been a “strongman” in the U.S. health system in ways which are not
always fully appreciated.22 The press for fundamental Medicaid reforms has been
presaged by the passage of SCHIP, a large collection of ongoing federally sanctioned
Medicaid demonstrations conducted under the legal authority of §1115 of the
Social Security Act, and most recently, the Medicaid provisions of the Medicare
Prescription Drug Improvement and Modernization Act of 2003,23 which eliminated
federally assisted Medicaid prescription drug coverage for millions of dually enrolled
Medicare beneficiaries.24 Observers anticipate that the press for reform will reach
a legislative crescendo as early as the 109th Congress, which convenes in 2005, in
view of the program’s perceived financial unsustainability and its fundamental

Sara Rosenbaum et. al., SCHIP Policy Brief #2: State Benefit Design Choices Under SCHIP-Implications
for Pediatric Health Care (The George Washington University Medical Center, Washington D.C.), at
http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/SCHIP-_brief2.pdf (May 2001).
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Mann, et. al., Center on Budget and Policy Priorities, Administration’s Medicaid Proposal Would Shift
FiscalRisks to States (April 2003) at http://www.cbpp.org/4-1-03health.htm; Kaiser Commission
on Medicaid and the Uninsured, 2004. The New Medicare Prescription Drug Law: Issues for Dual Eligibles
with Disabilities and Serious Conditions (July 1, 2004) [hereinafter New Drug Law] at http://www.kff.org/
medicaid/7119.cfm (last visited October 2004).
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incompatibility with modern notions of federalism and market regulation.25 For
this reason, the course of SCHIP implementation, along with these other policy
developments, may offer critical lessons for Medicaid reform.
The study of SCHIP design takes on importance for other reasons as well.
Across the spectrum of preventive, routine, and long-term and extended care, the
fact that coverage matters for children is a well established one.26 Where coverage
shifts from rich and deep to more limited and narrow, the ability to finance the level
and depth of health care necessary to reach an appropriate standard of care for
children, particularly those with lower incomes and serious illnesses and disabilities
may diminish.27 For this reason, understanding shifts in benefit design, which have
implications for the range of health services that can be supported, is of the utmost
importance. In an era of constricting concepts of standard health insurance design,
it becomes especially important to examine coverage design in depth, in terms of
the classes of services and benefits offered, the services, treatments, and conditions
that are excluded, the service definitions used, and the standard of medical necessity
governing the provision of covered services.28 Understanding how variations in
coverage design, at both the macro and individual level, ultimately influence access
to and use of health care is actually not particularly well researched, because of the
difficulties inherent in using large population and coverage data sets to analyze

John K. Iglehart, The Dilemma of Medicaid, 348(21) NEW ENG. J. OF MED. 2140 (2003); Weil supra
note 7; John Holahan & Alan Weil, Medicaid moving in the wrong direction? (Urban Institute, Washington,
D.C., June 18, 2003), available at http://www.urban.org/urlprint.cfm?ID=8453; John Holahan &
Alan Weil, Block Grants are the Wrong Prescription for Medicaid, HEALTH POLICY ONLINE (Urban Institute,
Washington, D.C.), at http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/900624-HPOnline-6.pdf.
26
The David and Lucille Packard Foundation, Health Insurance for Children, Future of Children
(Spring 2003) available at http://www.futureofchildren.org (last modified Spring 2003); Children’s
Health – Why Health Insurance Matters, Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (The
Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, May 2002) ,available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/
loader.cfm; Lisa Dubay & Genevieve M. Kenney, Health Care Access and Use Among Low-Income
Children: Who Fares Best?, HEALTH AFFAIRS 20:1, 112 (2001); Paul W. Newacheck, Jeffrey J. Stoddard,
Dana Hughes, & Michelle Pearl, Health Insurance and Access to Primary Care for Children, 338 NEW
ENG. J. MED No. 8, 513-19 (February 19, 1998); Paul W. Newacheck, Michelle Pearl, Dana Hughes,
and Neal Halfon, 1998b. The Role of Medicaid in Ensuring Children’s Access to Care, JAMA 78:8 J. AM.
MED. ASS’N 927-933; Alan C. Monheit & Peter J. Cunningham, Children Without Health Insurance, 2
U.S. HEALTH CARE FOR CHILD No. 2, 154-170 (Winter 1992).
27
Rosenbaum et al., supra note 21; Rosenbaum et. al., supra note 2.
28
Id.
25
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health care access and utilization for low prevalence conditions.29 At the same
time, the relationship between coverage and access is sufficiently strong to suggest
that the issue of coverage, particularly for persons with limited means, must be
understood well beyond the threshold question of whether any coverage exists.30
To that end, studies of the intricacies of coverage become the starting point for
this type of research.
The first part of this article lays out the context for our study by examining
Medicaid and SCHIP in their legislative structure and detail. Part Two presents the
key findings from our research. Part Three discusses the implications of our findings
for the future of Medicaid for children.
Bedfellows: Medicaid and SCHIP
The starting point for this study is an overview of Medicaid and SCHIP,
existing side-by-side in the Social Security Act, but which in many respects are as
different as the more famous Medicare/Medicaid duo.
Medicaid
Codified at Title XIX, Medicaid is the nation’s single largest source of health
insurance, covering some 51 million persons as of 2002 at a total cost of more than
$200 billion.31 Despite its more limited popularity than Medicare, Medicaid is in
some respects the most extraordinary surviving statutory legacy of the Great Society,
enacted in 1965 as an “afterthought” to Medicare, and a “relegation” to states of
responsibility for insuring the poor.32 Medicaid is the largest surviving public meanstested legal entitlement. The Medicaid entitlement is three-fold. First, the law
entitles states to open-ended federal financial assistance for the cost of dozens of
classes of federally recognized health services furnished to eligible and enrolled

Id.
Id.
31
Diane Rowland, House Commerce Committee, Challenges Facing the Medicaid Program in the 21st
Century, (October 8, 2003) at http://www.kff.org/content/testimony/cfm (last visited September
24, 2004).
32
RASHI FEIN, MEDICAL CARE, MEDICAL COSTS: THE SEARCH FOR A HEALTH INSURANCE POLICY (Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, MA) (1998).
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persons by qualified and participating health care providers. Second, the program
entitles qualified providers to payment for furnishing covered services to enrolled
persons, although the terms of payment are left in most cases to state discretion.33
Third, Medicaid entitles beneficiaries to a federally defined set of “medical
assistance” benefits and services which fall within the federal definition. The federal
definition of what constitutes “medical assistance” is exceptionally broad, extending
to routine, primary, acute, and long-term services. Many forms of “medical
assistance” are mandatory while others are optional. There is no particular logic to
coverage mandates and options. For example, “rural health clinic” services are
mandatory while prescription drug coverage is optional. In 2002, close to twothirds of all federal and state Medicaid expenditures were for services classified as
“optional.”34
Unlike Medicare, Medicaid contains no explicit provisions allowing
beneficiaries to bring legal actions to enforce their federal legal entitlement.35 At
the same time however, the courts have recognized the legal entitlement as
individually enforceable since the program’s inception, despite serious erosion of
enforcement rights in the case of other Social Security Act benefits in recent years.36
Medicaid has a special relationship to children. Children comprise half of
all Medicaid enrollees; in 2002, the program financed one third of all U.S. births
and by 2003, covered 25% of all children.37 Between 1980 and 2002, the proportion

RAND ROSENBLATT, SLYVIA LAW, & SARA ROSENBAUM, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM
(Foundation Press, New York, NY, 1997); RAND ROSENBLATT, SARA ROSENBAUM & DAVID M.
FRANKFORD, LAW AND THE AMERICAN HEALTH CARE SYSTEM (Foundation Press, New York, NY)
(1997 & Supp. 2002).
34
Kaiser Commission, supra note 8.
35
TIMOTHY S. JOST, DISENTITLEMENT? THE THREATS FACING OUR PUBLIC HEALTH CARE PROGRAMS
AND A RIGHT-BASED RESPONSE (Oxford University Press, New York, NY, 2003); Rosenblatt, et. al.,
supra note 33.
36
Rosenblatt, Law & Rosenbaum, supra note 8; Jost, supra note 35; John Holahan, Alan Weil &
Joshua M. Weiner, Which Way for Federalism and Health Policy? HEALTH AFFAIRS WEB EXCLUSIVE, July
16, 2003, at http://www.healthaffairs.org/WebExclusives/2205Holahan.pdf (accessed October
13, 2003); Weil, supra note 7; Rosenbaum, supra note 1.
37
National Governor’s Association MCH Update 2002: State Health Coverage for Low-Income Pregnant
Women, Children, and Parents (June 10, 2003) available at http://www.nga.org/cda/files/
MCHUPDATE02.pdf; Census Bureau, Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage: 2003 (2004)
available at http://www.census.gov/Press-Release/www/2004/IncPov04slides1-3.pdf.
33
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of children covered by Medicaid more than doubled, from approximately 10 million
to 25 million, as a result of coverage expansions either mandated by Congress or
adopted by states, sustained high levels of childhood poverty, and the long-term
erosion of employment-based health insurance coverage for lower wage workers
and their families.38
Children eligible for Medicaid on a mandatory basis are those who live in
families with countable family incomes at 133% of the federal poverty level in the
case of infants and children under age 6 and 100% of the federal poverty level for
children ages 6-18.39 Children for whom Medicaid is mandatory are also those who
receive Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits on the basis of blindness or
disability, and children in families whose categorical and financial characteristics
leave them “related to” states’ 1996 eligibility standards for Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (which was repealed by the Welfare Reform Act of 1996).40
The official poverty level figure is misleadingly low in the case of children
enrolled in Medicaid on the basis of income.41 In Medicaid, as in other public
welfare entitlements, financial eligibility is calculated on the basis of “countable”
or “net” income following the application of numerous financial disregards and
adjustments to household income required under law. Work and shelter expenses
qualify for certain deductions, certain family income - such as SSI benefits received
by a sibling or a parent are disregarded, and a portion of child support payments
also is disregarded.42 In the case of lower income children who live in large
households with extended family members, only parental income, rather than total
household income is counted. As a result of these financial adjustments (which in

Peter J. Cunningham, Jack Hadley, & James D. Reschovsky, The Effects of SCHIP on Children’s
Health Insurance Coverage, MED. CARE RESEARCH & REVIEW 59:4, 359 (Dec. 2002).
39
Schneider et al., supra note 6; Kaiser Commission, supra note 8; Cindy Mann, Diane Rowland, &
Rachel Garfield, Historical Overview of Children’s Health Care Coverage, 13 HEALTH INS. FOR CHILD. No.
1, 36.
40
Garfield et al., supra note 6.
41
Sara Rosenbaum & Anne Markus, 2002 SCHIP Policy Brief #4: State Eligibility Rules under
Separate State SCHIP Programs-Implications for Children’s Access to Care (Geo. Washington
Univ. Med. Ctr., Washington, DC) http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/SCHIP-_brief4.pdf.
42
Id.
38
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concept parallel the income adjustments in the Internal Revenue Code) children
may qualify for Medicaid as poverty level recipients when in fact their incomes
considerably surpass the federal poverty level.43
Furthermore, Medicaid’s financial eligibility options where children and
pregnant women are concerned are virtually limitless as a result of a provision
added to the program by the (subsequently repealed) Medicare Catastrophic
Coverage Act of 1988.44 This provision (which survived repeal) permits states to
extend Medicaid to any child through the use of more generous income and asset
“disregards” used to calculate financial eligibility for Medicaid. For example, a
state might double the shelter allowance and treble the earned income deduction,
thereby counting as “poverty level” children, those whose families’ gross incomes
actually reach or exceed twice the federal poverty level. As of 1997, the year of
SCHIP’s enactment, a few states had taken advantage of this option either through
the state plan amendment process or as part of a broader Medicaid demonstration.45
Most states however eschewed this option; indeed by 1997, Medicaid had undergone
the “near death” experience of being block granted as part of the 1996 welfare
reform legislation and states were in no mood to extend legal entitlements to millions
of children, particularly in a booming period of economic recovery.46
It is also worth noting that Medicaid eligibility can begin up to 3 months
prior to the date of application in cases in which the individual would have satisfied
program eligibility standards had application occurred at an earlier point.47 This
provision plays a particularly important role for both children and adults who may
be uninsured at the time of a major health event and whose application comes only
after the fact. The retroactivity aspect of Medicaid underscores its role as a program
which operates outside the norms of conventional insurance, without pre-existing
condition exclusions, waiting periods, or other barriers to enrollment essential to
the proper functioning of a risk pool.48

Id.
§303(d) and §303(e) (5) of Pub. L. 100-360. The Act, which added prescription drug coverage
to Medicare, was subsequently repealed, but this Medicaid provision survived.
45
Mann et al., supra note 39, at 37.
46
Rosenbaum & Sonosky, supra note 12, at 100.
47
Schneider et al., supra note 6.
48
Rosenbaum, supra note 1; Weil, supra note 7; Schneider et al., supra note 6.
43
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Where children are concerned, Medicaid is particularly important, not only
because of its unusually generous eligibility standards, but also because of its singular
coverage rules. Children’s Medicaid legal entitlement to coverage encompasses an
extraordinary range and depth of benefits and services, and the rules of coverage
are found nowhere else in insurance law. These rules survive even when children
are enrolled in managed care systems which furnish less than all covered benefits,
because they are part of the federal legal entitlement to coverage itself.49 As a
result of legislative amendments enacted in 1967, revised in 1981 and again in
1989,50 Medicaid coverage requirements extend far beyond the standards applicable
to adults. With the exception of the small number of “medically needy” children
who “spend down” to eligibility by incurring high health care costs, all Medicaid
enrolled children under age 21 are entitled to Early and Periodic Screening Diagnostic
and Treatment (EPSDT) services.51 These services consist of comprehensive
periodic and “as needed” health exams to identify physical, mental, and
developmental conditions, complete vision, dental and hearing care, all
immunizations recommended by the Advisory Committee on Immunization
Practices (an advisory body to the CDC), and all medically necessary diagnoses and
treatments, which fall within the federal definition of “medical assistance,”
determined to be necessary to treat or “ameliorate” children’s physical and mental
health conditions disclosed through screens.52 Thus, while many forms of medical
assistance are optional for adults, all benefits and services falling within the federal
definition of medical assistance are mandatory for children. (See Figure 1 pg. 12).

Rosenblatt, Law & Rosenbaum, supra note 33, at 110.
42 U.S.C.A. §19 (2004).
51
Sara Rosenbaum et al., Room to Grow: Promoting Child Development through Medicaid and SCHIP
(Commonwealth Fund, NY, NY) at http://www.cmwf.org/programs/child/
rosenbaum_room_451.pdf (June 2001); Rosenbaum, et. al., supra note 21.
52
Sara Rosenbaum, Michelle Proser, Andy Schneider & Colleen Sonosky, Room to Grow: Promoting
Child Development through Medicaid and SCHIP (Commonwealth Fund, NY, NY) at http://
www.cmwf.org/programs/child/rosenbaum_room_451.pdf (June 2001); Rosenbaum, et. al., supra
note 21.
49
50
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Figure 1. The EPSDT Benefit53
1. PERIODIC AND “AS NEEDED” SCREENING SERVICES
THAT INCLUDE:
· An unclothed physical examination
· Comprehensive health and developmental history (including
assessment of both physical and mental health development)
· Immunizations recommended by the CDC Advisory Committee
on immunization practices
· Laboratory tests (including blood lead level assessment appropriate
for age and risk factors)
· Health education
2. VISION SERVICES (ASSESSMENT, DIAGNOSIS AND
TREATMENT INCLUDING EYEGLASSES)
3. HEARING SERVICES (ASSESSMENT, DIAGNOSIS AND
TREATMENT INCLUDING HEARING AIDS)
4. DENTAL SERVICES WHICH INCLUDE AT A MINIMUM
RELIEF OF PAIN AND INFECTIONS, RESTORATION OF
TEETH AND MAINTENANCE OF DENTAL HEALTH
5. SUCH NECESSARY HEALTH CARE, DIAGNOSTIC SERVICES,
TREATMENT AND OTHER MEASURES CLASSIFIED AS
MEDICAL ASSISTANCE TO CORRECT OR AMELIORATE
DEFECTS AND PHYSICAL AND MENTAL HEALTH
CONDITIONS DISCOVERED BY SCREENING SERVICES,
WHETHER OR NOT SUCH SERVICES ARE COVERED UNDER
THE STATE MEDICAL ASSISTANCE PLAN.
6. A “PREVENTIVE” STANDARD OF MEDICAL NECESSITY,
RECOGNIZED IN AGENCY IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES
AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS

§1905(r) of the Soc.Sec.Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396d(r); Part 5, Section 5122 of the State Medicaid
Manual, available at: http://www.cms.hhs.gov/manuals/pub45/pub_45.asp.
53
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In some respects, the rules of coverage where children are concerned are
even more notable than the broad classes of coverage themselves. Federal law
prohibits application to children under 18 of even nominal co-payments for covered
benefits and services.54 Even more dramatic is the framework applicable to medical
necessity determinations under the program. Medicaid does not explicitly define
medical necessity for any covered population, including children, requiring instead
that state definitions be reasonable, consistent with the program’s overall purposes,
and not discriminate in the provision of mandated services against particular
conditions or illnesses.55 Where children are concerned, the federal legal principles
of reasonableness applicable to state coverage standards, as construed under a nearly
40 year-old judicial and administrative interpretive “gloss,” coupled with the terms
“early” and “ameliorate” in the EPSDT statute itself, and the program’s fabled
legislative history,56 underscore the preventive nature of the EPSDT legal entitlement
and reject arbitrary limits on coverage (such as fixed day, treatment or dollar limits)
unrelated to the medical need for treatment.57 These judicial rulings and agency
interpretations were powerfully reinforced by the 1989 EPSDT legislative
amendments, which broadly expanded the diagnosis and treatment mandate to
include all forms of medical assistance, added mandatory coverage for “as needed”
examinations, and tied the concept of medical necessity to the recommendations
of treating health professionals.58 While the 1984 regulations have never been
updated to reflect the amendments (a sure sign of the program’s controversial

Rosenbaum & Rousseau, supra note 1; Schneider et al., supra note 6.
42 C.F.R. §440.230(b0, 42 C.F.R. §440.230(c). For a discussion of the special Medicaid principles
that govern coverage of children, see Sara Rosenbaum & Colleen Sonosky, Federal EPSDT Coverage
Policy: An Analysis of State Medicaid Plans and State Medicaid Managed Care Contracts (2002) at http://
www.gwhealthpolicy.org/medicaid_publications_epsdt.htm.
56
More specifically, the statute was modified in response to two seminal pieces of health services
research, which examined the diminished health status of the first young children enrolled in Head
Start, as well as the very serious disabling conditions affecting low-income young adults rejected
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nature), the most recent federal guidelines reinforce its scope and reach.59 As a
result, diagnosis and treatment must be furnished at the earliest possible point in
the progression of a condition, and the recommendations of treating clinicians are
considered to carry especially great weight.60
In sum, both historically and legally, the term “medical necessity” in a
Medicaid child health context is grounded in concepts of early intervention to
ameliorate physical and health conditions, and is a bar against arbitrary limits on
diagnosis and treatment unrelated to the recommendations of treating conditions.61
Furthermore, when read in the context of Medicaid’s general prohibition against
discrimination in the provision of mandatory treatments and services based on an
individual’s diagnosis or condition, these special coverage rules result in a form of
third party financing which, simply stated, has no counterpart in the commercial
insurance market.62 For Medicaid enrolled children, virtually any form of health
care is covered from the time that its clinical need is first suspected; treatments
range from medical interventions necessary to diagnose and treat conditions to
clinically recommended preventive therapies furnished by “licensed practitioners
of the healing arts.”63 Covered treatments must be furnished without the types of
“macro” exclusions and limitations which tend to characterize the commercial
market.64 As a result, Medicaid treatments for children encompass not only treatment
necessary for “recovery” or “improvement” from “illness or injury” but also
treatments necessary to avoid or ameliorate the long-term effects of chronic illness
and disability from which there may never be recovery or improvement in the
narrow sense of the terms.65 In the case of Medicaid coverage for children, there
is no need to show that a recommended treatment will allow a child to “recover
normal functioning” following an “illness or injury” as there typically would be in
the case of commercial insurance.66 Nor does Medicaid contain the typical pediatric
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exclusions found in commercial plans, such as “educational” exclusions; indeed,
Medicaid specifically mandates coverage of all otherwise covered items and services
listed in special educational or early intervention plans developed for children with
disabilities under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).67
To be sure, an expanded notion of coverage is one of Medicaid’s most
essential attributes for adults as well, which accounts for the fact that more than
two-thirds of all Medicaid expenditures are for the elderly and persons with severe
disabilities.68 But in the case of adults, much of this coverage is optional with state
programs, whereas it is required for children.69 Indeed, so broad is Medicaid coverage
for children that although its coverage is classified as “insurance” for purposes of
statistical population coverage estimates, its “legal operating system” follows
absolutely none of the conventions of insurance, particularly where children are
concerned.70 Medicaid in a child health context is best thought of as a legal
entitlement among eligible children to comprehensive health care financing.
It should come as no surprise that the EPSDT program – and the 1989
EPSDT amendments in particular, which radically expanded the rules of coverage
– have proven to be politically unpopular.71 States have repeatedly called for
relaxation of federal standards, and EPSDT requirements have consistently ranked
at the top of lists compiled by Governors and state legislators when asked to identify
unreasonable Medicaid standards.72 When asked to explain the opposition, state
Medicaid officials point to examples of what they consider to be wildly unreasonable
service requests, such as dance therapy for children with disabilities or horseback
riding therapy. There exists, however, no systematic evidence of the extent to
which non-traditional therapeutic services aimed at improving emotional and physical
health dominate EPSDT spending; indeed, federal expenditure data underscore
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the extent to which spending on children is for entirely traditional forms of medical
care such as physician and hospital services, prescription drugs, medical equipment,
and diagnostic services.73
SCHIP
SCHIP is a grant-in-aid statute which entitles participating states to an annual
aggregate payment toward the cost of “child health assistance” furnished by
participating providers to enrolled children.74 Unlike Medicaid which is perpetual,
SCHIP was authorized for a 10-year term.75
In popular lore, SCHIP had its genesis in the desire of Congress and the
President to find common ground following the failure of national health reform.76
In the wake of the 1996 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA), which provided for greater “portability” of employee health benefits,
SCHIP was presented as a bipartisan consensus regarding the appropriate role of
the federal government in subsidizing health care for lower income uninsured
children without access to Medicaid.77 The legislation received heavy support from
traditional children’s advocacy groups.78
The reality regarding SCHIP’s origins is far more complicated. In its policy
aims, the legislation may have had roots in expansive concepts. In its statutory
structure however, SCHIP was the child of the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (welfare reform).79 Until the threat of a
Presidential veto resulted in its removal, the 1996 legislation contained a successor
program to Medicaid, which would have replaced the law with an aggregate, capped
federal grant-in-aid program which entitled states to assistance but removed the
individual legal entitlement as well as virtually all coverage, payment, and detailed

Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2003 Data Compendium, available at http://
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administration requirements.80 These characteristics also constitute a near-perfect
description of the SCHIP statutory structure.81
Even more strikingly, SCHIP does not merely permit states to augment
Medicaid coverage: it allows them to use SCHIP as an alternative to Medicaid
coverage.82 That is, states can either combine approaches or choose either to operate
SCHIP as a separate program or to allocate their payments toward Medicaid
expansions.83 The children covered under a state’s separate SCHIP would be
Medicaid-ineligible children with family incomes at or below 200% of the federal
poverty level, or at a slightly higher eligibility level in states which had generous
Medicaid programs already reaching SCHIP’s 200% threshold.84 Children with
incomes exceeding the SCHIP upper limit could qualify for Medicaid either as
medically needy or through the use of the special 1989 legislative authority to extend
coverage to all children who might require Medicaid as either a primary or
supplemental insurer.85 The bottom line is that states could effectively substitute
SCHIP for Medicaid in the case of uninsured children with incomes above
mandatory Medicaid eligibility levels. (See figure 2 pg. 19).
On the face of it then, SCHIP would seem like a particularly loopy legislative
initiative. Why would Congress, which hardly can be said to spend excessively on
public welfare programs for low-income families, allocate $40 billion in scarce federal
resources over a 10 year time period (the SCHIP price tag) for a program which
appears to be utterly duplicative of what Medicaid already permits where children
are concerned? The answer, of course, lays in SCHIP’s coverage design rules. It is
true that SCHIP also provides for a more generous federal subsidy than the level
allowed states under Medicaid; but when Senators Rockefeller and Chafee attempted
to offer an amendment during the 1997 Senate Finance Committee’s consideration
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of the legislation to increase federal matching rates for certain optional children in
lieu of establishing a new program, their proposal was rejected in the face of
opposition by other Members of the Committee and the Governor’s Association.86
It is in the area of coverage design where SCHIP’s “not-Medicaid” character and
strength (at least from a state perspective) can be seen.87
SCHIP departs utterly from Medicaid in virtually every key respect where
coverage is concerned. First, the legislation expressly eliminates the individual legal
entitlement which lies at the heart of Medicaid, while simultaneously creating a
legal entitlement to allotments in participating states.88 Second, SCHIP replaces
Medicaid’s defined benefit medical assistance structure with a “premium support”
model using the “basic services” covered in the law’s actuarial benchmarks to calibrate
the coverage obligations of approved state plans.89 The SCHIP “benchmarks”
from which states can choose are the Federal Employee Health Benefit Plan, the
health benefit plan offered state employees in a participating state, or the best selling
HMO product in the state.90 In other words, the “child health assistance” extended
to eligible children under SCHIP consists of subsidization of enrollment into a
participating plan offering “benchmark” coverage. 91 Thus, coverage, as
conceptualized in SCHIP, was a direct legislative precursor to the premium support
approach to coverage of prescription drug benefits, which was taken in the 2003
Medicare legislation; unlike the Medicare legislation however, SCHIP specifies no
statutory standards for participating plans, although implementing federal regulations
do contain certain enrollment and other safeguards.92
While the SCHIP statute enumerates benefits which in their terms parallel
the Medicaid definition of “medical assistance,” this enumeration identifies what
states may spend money on, not what they must cover.93 For all practical purposes,
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Figure 2. SCHIP as a Coverage Alternative to Medicaid

Any income level

Children whose coverage is optional
under Medicaid

200%FPL (2)

Children whose coverage is optional
under either Medicaid or SCHIP
133%/
100%FPL (1)

Children whose Medicaid
coverage is mandatory

(1)Under Medicaid, mandatory groups are children ages 0-6 under 133%FPL and children ages 6-19 under 100%FPL.
(2)Targeted children under SCHIP are children with incomes between the upper Medicaid eligibility level in the state
and 200%FPL (with some exceptions in states with Medicaid eligibility levels already above 200%FPL where SCHIP
eligibility can be extended up to 50 percentage points over the maximum Medicaid level). This means that the SCHIP
population represented by the middle circle shrinks and grows depending on Medicaid policy in the state. These
children are also optional children under Medicaid and were so before SCHIP was enacted.
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the only standard which counts is the actuarial “basic benefit” benchmark; if a state
selects a benchmark which includes “additional” services other than those considered
“basic,” then it must offer those services at a “substantial actuarial value.”94 The
SCHIP statute contains no rules of coverage other than a bar against the imposition
of pre-existing condition exclusions.95 Basic benefits consist of “inpatient and
outpatient hospital services, physicians’ surgical and medical services, laboratory
and x-ray services, well-baby and well-child care (as defined by the state), and age
appropriate immunizations.”96 “Additional” service “categories” consist of
“prescription drugs, mental health services, vision services, and hearing services.”97
Within the categories of “basic” and “additional” service, no standards
exist with respect to tests of reasonableness, definitions of benefits, medical necessity
standards, or non-discrimination in coverage.98 The law does prohibit the imposition
of pre-existing condition exclusions and specifies the applicability of HIPAA
portability and mental health parity standards. 99 Implementing regulations
interpreted these provisions slightly more explicitly (for example, the rules define
the term “age appropriate immunizations” to cover all ACIP-approved vaccines
and specify coverage of “emergency” care).100 But for all practical purposes, the
rules adhere to the vagaries of the statute, leaving states and their plan contractors
with immense discretion over benefit design.
A clear example of the discretion enjoyed by states can be seen in the
definition of an EPSDT examination compared to a SCHIP well-baby exam. The
Medicaid statute defines an EPSDT “periodic screen” as an assessment which
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encompasses specified procedures: a health history, an unclothed physical
examination, an assessment of growth and development, appropriate laboratory
tests (including tests for elevated blood lead exposure), ACIP-required
immunizations, assessments of vision and hearing in accordance with professional
standards, and a referral to a dentist for preventive, restorative and emergency
treatment.101 The SCHIP statute, in contrast, contains no specifications regarding
well-baby or well-child exams, and implementing regulations clarify that the content
is defined by a state.102
It is also important to note that unlike Medicaid, SCHIP cannot supplement
inadequate coverage; the statute’s health insurance “anti-crowd-out” provisions
explicitly prohibit its use to enhance existing coverage.103
In sum, as Figure 3 shows, SCHIP is a variation on a state block grant, not
a public legal entitlement. The statute was deliberately structured to operate as a
substitute for Medicaid expansions into the near-poor child population, a vastly more
palatable approach from a state policy perspective.104 SCHIP creates a legal
entitlement (albeit capped) in states but bars comparable treatment of children.105
The statute uses a premium support approach to coverage, eliminates virtually all
coverage design requirements applicable to children, not only in terms of classes
of benefits and services but equally as importantly, in terms of the rules of coverage
themselves.106 In addition, the statute permits premiums and patient cost sharing.107
(See Figure 3 pg. 22-23).
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Figure 3. A Broad Comparison of Benefit Design Requirements
Under Medicaid and SCHIP

SCHIP

MEDICAID
Participating states must entitle eligible
children to a broad range of required
classes of “medical assistance”.
Required coverage for children is
federally defined and nationally uniform
in scope:
• The EPSDT benefit encompasses
detailed statutory assessment
procedures, vision, dental and
hearing services, and all forms of
treatment that fall within the
federal definition of “medical
assistance.”
• No distinctions are drawn between
physical and mental conditions.

Participating states must furnish “child
health assistance,” which is subject to
certain basic design rules but is not a legal
entitlement in eligible children. States’
coverage design flexibility is subject to
certain rules:
•

Coverage must be “equivalent
to,” and must have an
“aggregate actuarial value that
is at least actuarially equivalent”
to, a “benchmark benefit
package” selected by the state.

•

Required categories of “basic
services” must be included in
the benchmark (inpatient and
outpatient hospital care,
physician surgical and medical
services, laboratory and x-ray
services, “well baby and well
child” care (undefined) and age
appropriate immunizations.

•

States have the option of
covering prescription drugs,
mental health services, vision
services, hearing services, and
other services recognized as
“child health assistance.”
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Figure 3. A Broad Comparison of Benefit Design Requirements
Under Medicaid and SCHIP (continued)

MEDICAID

SCHIP

The concept of medical necessity is
subject to federal rules. States must use
a “preventive” standard of medical
necessity in accordance with the benefit
and federal standards of reasonableness
and prohibitions against discrimination
on the basis of condition or illness.

There is no federal definition of medical
necessity, tests of reasonableness, or
non-discrimination in coverage
provisions. HIPAA prohibitions against
preexisting condition exclusions apply to
insurance products however.

Cost-sharing is prohibited for all
categorically needy children.

Cost-sharing is permitted subject to
certain limits but is prohibited for well
baby and well child care including
immunizations.

Children are legally entitled to a defined
group of benefits. States remain directly
obligated to cover all benefits that exceed
limits of MCO contracts.

Benefits are not a federal legal
entitlement. States are not obligated to
furnish defined benefits beyond the
benchmark.
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In terms of the proportion of children receiving any level of publicly
supported health care financing assistance, the SCHIP approach definitely has
worked; indeed, the program’s impact was immediate.108 Whereas states’ response
to the 1988 Medicaid option to reach all children in need of health insurance could
be described as lethargic at best, within 3 years, all states had implemented at least
some level of expanded coverage under SCHIP.109 Figure 4 shows states’
implementation choices and 2002 eligibility levels. Figure 4 clusters states into three
separate tiers. At the top are the 15 states and the District of Columbia that invested
their SCHIP allotments solely into Medicaid expansions. The middle tier shows
states that implemented SCHIP as a hybrid, expanding Medicaid somewhat and
filling in the rest with a separately-administered program at somewhat higher income
levels, in an attempt to balance the two main issues of entitling the poorest children
and smoothing out the age bands (so that older poor children would be equitably
treated compared to younger poor children) on the one hand, and providing less
generous treatment for the near poor, on the other hand. The third tier shows
states that used their allotments solely to establish a separately-administered program;
this tier includes Pennsylvania, one of three states with Florida and New York,
whose separate children’s insurance programs was already in place at the time of
SCHIP’s enactment and was grandfathered into the new law by statute. (See Figure
4 pg. 25).
There have been no published studies on the politics of state
implementation, but the wealth of contemporary publicity, meetings, and anecdotal
evidence that have accompanied implementation suggest that two related factors
have tended to influence which tier a state ultimately fell into. The first factor was
the issue of legal entitlements. State officials reported that the ability to avoid an
entitlement and the relatively uncontrollable expenditure vulnerability that goes
along with it heavily influenced their decisions regarding whether to implement
SCHIP fully or partially as a separate program.110 In fact, no state that established
a separate SCHIP program did so as a state legal entitlement.111 It is therefore
ironic, perhaps, that implementation of SCHIP was accompanied by an explosion
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Figure 4. State Implementation Choices and
Eligibility Levels under SCHIP
(2002 Upper SCHIP Income Eligibility Limit)

MEDICAID EXPANSION ONLY
Alaska (200%FPL), Arkansas (200%FPL), District of Columbia (200%FPL),
Hawaii (200%FPL), Idaho (150%FPL), Louisiana (200%FPL), Minnesota
(280%FPL, ages 0-2), Missouri (300%FPL), Nebraska (185%FPL), New
Mexico (235%FPL), Ohio (200%FPL), Oklahoma (185%FPL), Rhode
Island (250% FPL), South Carolina (150%FPL, ages 1-18), Tennessee
(200%FPL), Wisconsin (200%FPL)
MEDICAID EXPANSION AND SEPARATELY-ADMINISTERED
SCHIP PLAN
Alabama (200%FPL), California (250%FPL), Connecticut (300%FPL),
Florida (200%FPL, ages 1-18), Illinois (185%FPL), Indiana (200%FPL),
Iowa (200%FPL), Kentucky (200%FPL), Maine (200%FPL), Maryland
(300%FPL), Massachusetts (200%FPL, ages 1-18), Michigan (200%FPL),
Mississippi (200%FPL), New Hampshire (300%FPL, ages 1-18), New Jersey
(350%FPL), New York (250%FPL), North Dakota (140%FPL), South
Dakota (200%FPL), Texas (200%FPL), Virginia (200%FPL)
SEPARATELY-ADMINISTERED SCHIP PLAN ONLY
Arizona (200%FPL), Colorado (185%FPL), Delaware (200%FPL), Georgia
(235%FPL), Kansas (200%FPL), Montana (150%FPL), Nevada (200%FPL),
North Carolina (200%FPL), Oregon (170%FPL), Pennsylvania (235%FPL),
Utah (200%FPL), Vermont (300%FPL), Washington (250%FPL), Wyoming
(133%FPL), West Virginia (200%FPL)
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of children’s enrollment into Medicaid, even in states that administered SCHIP as
a separate program.112 The cause of this rapid run-up in children’s Medicaid
enrollment was that many - and in some states most - of the children identified
through aggressive outreach were poor enough to be enrolled in Medicaid and
therefore barred by federal law in enrollment into SCHIP, since SCHIP is limited
to children who are ineligible for other forms of coverage113
The second issue frequently reported by state officials was the politics of
Medicaid’s coverage design for children. Numerous officials suggested strong
political objections to such broad coverage for near-poor children in terms of both
the comprehensiveness of benefits and the prohibitions against cost-sharing.114 One
study for the United States Department of Health and Human Services that was
published in the early years of implementation suggested that while states with
separately-administered programs were pursuing cost-sharing, the actual level of
cost-sharing requirements imposed was well below the level permitted under federal
law.115 At the same time, the ability to impose cost-sharing (in particular, premiums
at higher levels of family income, a practice pursued by 29 states as of 2000) was
viewed as politically important. 116
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Findings from the SCHIP Design Studies
Given the potential importance of benefit design flexibility accorded under
the SCHIP statute, as well as its potential to allow states broad latitude in benefit
design, a group of researchers at George Washington University (GWU) with
extensive experience in health insurance generally, and children’s insurance coverage
under Medicaid in particular, carried out a series of detailed descriptive studies
over the 1998-2002 time period which collectively sought to measure variations in
Medicaid and SCHIP design.117
Study methods
The study we report on here is a nationwide, point-in-time descriptive study of
coverage under Medicaid and SCHIP, which considers both the coverage offered
under states’ Medicaid and separately administered SCHIP plans, as well as the
coverage which is available through managed care contracts covering children eligible
for assistance. Both Medicaid and SCHIP agencies effectuate coverage either wholly
or partially through the compulsory enrollment of children in purchased managed
care arrangements.118 As a result, children may derive coverage from two sources:
the state plans for the program in which they are enrolled; and their managed care
contracts. For this reason, the studies had to be conducted in two phases. In the
first phase, researchers compared the details of coverage under state Medicaid and
SCHIP plans, as reported by participating Medicaid and SCHIP agencies to the
federal government. Such comparisons were once relatively easy, but for more
than a decade the federal government has maintained no centralized repository of
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detailed state plan information. For this reason, the task of determining what,
precisely, participating states cover under Medicaid and SCHIP has become a major
chore. Our previous research has reported on critical differences in SCHIP and
Medicaid state plans, the most important of which are silence in SCHIP plans on
the definition of medical necessity, as well as more limited coverage of chronic
care services, dental and mental health coverage.119
In the second phase of the study, managed care contracts had to be collected
and analyzed in order to compare their scope of coverage to the coverage offered
under their respective state plans. This step was important for two reasons. First,
states’ Medicaid and SCHIP contracts actually may go beyond the state plan in
their coverage specifications. That is, a state plan may not identify certain services
as covered for federal reporting purposes but nonetheless, the service is contractually
specified.
Second, in a study of trends in public insurance design, understanding which
benefits are included in the managed care contract and which remain as a direct
financial and performance obligation of a state agency, helps shed light on the
practical and political limits of the “marketization” of public insurance. The close
study of contracts written by Medicaid agencies reveals certain definite patterns
regarding which benefits are regarded as financially or administratively and medically
manageable in the private sector.120 For example, Medicaid contracts routinely
exempt certain classes of benefits (e.g., intermediate care facilities for persons with
mental retardation and home health services).121 Similarly, some of the benefits
covered in a Medicaid managed care contract may be subject to specified limits that
do not apply under the state plan. For example, a contract may place a limit on
psychiatric care of 26 mental health visits annually, but under EPSDT and Medicaid’s
general anti-discrimination rules, no such limit could be imposed by the state; that
is, the contractual benefit would have to be supplemented by direct state payments
were a child to need additional services.
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Similarly, some but not all prescription drugs covered under a state Medicaid
plan might be included in its managed care contracts, with the remaining drugs in
the state formulary covered under the state plan as a form of supplemental coverage.
Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in managed care effectively would be dually insured.122
Most interestingly perhaps, public contracts might be silent with respect to
certain critical definitional matters which undergird Medicaid benefits but that tend
to have no counterpart in privately sold managed care products.123 Two prime
examples are the medical necessity standard or explicit prohibitions against arbitrarily
limiting covered benefits based on an enrollee’s condition. In the absence of explicit
state policy (typically embodied in detailed contractual specifications), silence in
the contract would leave contractors with considerable discretion that state Medicaid
agencies themselves would not enjoy.124 Once again, Medicaid agencies would be
in the position of supplementing contractual services; non-contractual services
would be covered on an extra-contractual basis.125 (At the same time of course,
unless and until a beneficiary or her provider pursues a claim for residual benefits,
which necessitates a high degree of knowledge and sophistication about the inner
workings of Medicaid, a state presumably would be able to curb their financial
exposure for this penumbra of supplemental coverage surrounding the contractual
obligation.)
A classic and easy example of this coverage penumbra flowing from this
residual benefit phenomenon (which includes non-contractual benefits as well as
additional benefits flowing from EPSDT’s very liberal definition of medical
necessity) can be seen in the case of physical therapy for adults recovering from
stroke and a child with a developmental disability emanating from cerebral palsy. A
managed care contract which is silent on medical necessity would permit the
contractor to use a traditional insurance definition of medical necessity, which limits
coverage to covered diagnostic and treatment services which either restore or
improve functioning following an illness or injury.126 The child would need therapy,
not to recover from an illness (as would be the case for the patient recovering from
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a stroke), but in order to develop physical movement. Traditional insurance principles
would deny this coverage, a reality borne out by cases challenging the limits of
commercial insurance for children with developmental disabilities.127 The Medicaid
EPSDT benefit would mandate this coverage at the earliest point of diagnosis, and
coverage would be ongoing as long as clinically necessary.128 Were a Medicaid
managed care contract not to cover the service, the Medicaid agency would be
obligated to finance it directly and supplementally.129
For this reason, a close read of Medicaid and SCHIP coverage agreements
against the global provisions of state plans becomes essential when attempting to
understand the fine points of coverage differentials in the two programs. The
contract research phase of the project was conducted through the development of
a special data base created by George Washington University in 1994 and updated
three times over the ensuing time period.130 The data base for this study consists
of contract documents between contractors and Medicaid and SCHIP agencies
covering the 2001-2002 time period, and these contract provisions can be viewed
online.131
For this particular study, we focused on a subset of all states using managed
care in Medicaid and SCHIP as of 2002. Of the 27 state SCHIP programs using
managed care as of the study date, 12 State SCHIP agencies effectuated their
purchasing by “piggybacking” onto the state Medicaid contract; that is, these state
SCHIP agencies used the Medicaid contract, with variations essentially limited to
coverage, payment rates, and certain business terms.132 Medicaid enrolled children
in these 12 states would be entitled to supplemental or residual coverage, while
SCHIP-enrolled children would receive supplemental benefits only to the extent
covered in the separately administered SCHIP plan. With respect to contractual
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benefits however, children in these states would receive identical – or nearly identical
– coverage unless expressly stated in the agreement.133
In 15 states however (approximately 60% of all SCHIP states using managed
care products), the state SCHIP agency utilized a completely separate agreement
with its contractors at the time of the study.134 These separate agreements might
therefore vary considerably from their Medicaid counterparts with respect to
coverage.135 We focused on these states, because we concluded that they would
most clearly illustrate the degree of contractual distinctions drawn between the
two forms of managed care products.
We knew from our previous work that state SCHIP plans offered lesser
benefits in certain key areas than the scope of coverage found in state Medicaid
plans. We then examined the two sets of contracts in these 15 separate-contract
states and compared their terms to the information on state plan coverage under
both programs which we already had gleaned from our review of the state plans.
Where relevant, we have summarized the underlying state plan information in order
to aid understanding of the extent to which the contracts follow or depart from
their respective state plans.
SCHIP and Medicaid contracts tend to be exhaustive and detailed and are
far more prescriptive than most privately purchased agreements. This tendency to
tightly manage contractors is undoubtedly an outgrowth of the limited budgets
under which states operate and the low-income of their beneficiaries.136 State
agencies cannot afford “point-of-service” network options, and enrollees cannot
afford to augment their managed care benefits with out of pocket expenditures for
the services of balance billing, non-network providers.137 With tighter networks
come greater concerns over access to covered benefits, and as a result, SCHIP and
Medicaid agencies pay particular attention to how care is organized and delivered.138
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Because health care is so vast, perhaps the best way to understand how
these contracts operate, as well as their limitations, is to select treatments for one or
more specific conditions and view the agreements from a particular sub-population
or condition-specific vantage point.
For this article we selected early childhood development as the frame through
which the contracts would be analyzed. Early childhood development has become
a particular focus of our work for several reasons. First, it is a fascinating topic
from an insurance perspective because as noted earlier, the vast bulk of early
intervention health services fall within the scope of Medicaid but outside the more
conventional insurance norms reflected in the premium-support approach to SCHIP
coverage. Second, a great deal of attention has been focused on early child
development in recent years as a result of the Bush Administration’s No Child Left
Behind education reform legislation, which has reinforced Congressional interest
in early childhood.139 Since the federal Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
prohibits the use of federal funds to finance health therapies for infants and toddlers
receiving early intervention services, the extent to which health services promoting
development are found in Medicaid and SCHIP becomes highly important to lowincome children.140
A third reason to consider early intervention as the candidate treatment for
this study was that as research into early childhood development has intensified in
recent years, experts have been able to more clearly articulate the standard of care
that would be appropriate to the earliest possible identification of developmental
delays, as well as the types of health interventions that the evidence suggests would
be effective in reducing the potential for delay and ensure early access to treatment.141
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Figure 5 lists interventions found in the literature. (See Figure 5 pg. 35). These
interventions were used to create a taxonomy for contractual specification purposes,
so that findings could be presented regarding the relationship between these
interventions and specification of terms. The fact that a contract might be silent on
a specific intervention does not necessarily signify that an intervention is not
furnished by the contractor, only that the intervention is not a clear specification
of the agreement.142 A managed care contractor obviously has discretion to furnish
comprehensive childhood development services; however, research into managed
care industry custom and practice suggests that few managed care companies
specialize in comprehensive child development and consider the intervention to be
of limited relevance unless specified in the contract and/or specifically “incentivized”
through payment structure.143
Using the childhood development intervention, we fashioned the following
series of queries to the contract database in order to assess the relationship between
early intervention standards and contract specifications:
1) Coverage of preventive services: Whether contracts list specific elements
of coverage for preventive services for young children, including a
comprehensive medical and developmental screen, lead assessments (in view
of the impact of elevated lead exposure on childhood growth and
development) and anticipatory guidance.
2) Continuity of care: Whether contracts require contractors to ensure
continuity of care between health care arrangements predating children’s
enrollment and post-enrollment care.
3) Medical necessity standard: Whether contracts define the standard of
medical necessity to be used by contractors and, if so, whether the standard
followed the commercial standard of “restoring an individual to normal
functioning” or the “growth and development” standard used for children
in Medicaid.
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4) Provider network composition: Whether contracts require the contractor
to include child development specialists (e.g., pediatricians specializing in
child development, lactation counselors, social workers, etc.) in their network
of participating providers.
5) Supportive child development activities: Whether contracts require
contractors to undertake special child development activities such as health
education, and outreach efforts.
6) Care coordination with other key child development programs: Whether
contracts require contractors to coordinate care with early intervention
services for infants and toddlers under the Individuals with Disabilities
Education Act, which includes early intervention services for infants and
toddlers at risk of developmental delay.
7) Compensation linked to the quality of early childhood care: Whether
contracts provide for financial incentives (positive, such as bonuses, or
negative, such as penalties) for the contractor to ensure health care access
and/or quality of care for young children.

35

Figure 5. Pediatric Interventions Related to Early Childhood
Development144

ASSESSMENT: ASSESSMENT SERVICES INCLUDE
EVALUATION OF INFORMATION FROM PARENTS,
DEVELOPMENTAL MONITORING (INCLUDING
SCREENING FOR DEVELOPMENTAL PROBLEMS WHEN
INDICATED), PSYCHOSOCIAL ASSESSMENT, PARENTCHILD OBSERVATION, AND ASSESSMENTS OF CHILD
BEHAVIOR.
EDUCATION: EDUCATION SERVICES INCLUDE
ANTICIPATORY GUIDANCE ABOUT THE PARENTINFANT RELATIONSHIP, CHILD BEHAVIOR, AND
VARIOUS DEVELOPMENTAL ISSUES (E.G., PROMOTING
HEALTHY SLEEP HABITS AND DISCIPLINE PRACTICES)
AS WELL AS PARENTING EDUCATION IN DIFFERENT
FORMATS, SUCH AS CLASSES, SUPPORT GROUPS, AND
INSTRUCTION BY A PHYSICIAN OR NURSE.
INTERVENTION: INTERVENTION SERVICES INCLUDE
COUNSELING IN THE OFFICE SETTING, TELEPHONE
INFORMATION LINES, AND HOME VISITATION.
CARE COORDINATION: CARE COORDINATION
REFERS TO THE MANAGEMENT OF SERVICE NEEDS
SUCH AS REFERRALS FOR DIAGNOSTIC ASSESSMENTS
OR SPECIALISTS.
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SCHIP Plans versus SCHIP Contracts
The findings are presented on Tables 1 and 2. Table 1 shows the extent of
childhood development-related coverage in states with both separately-administered
SCHIP plans and separately-administered SCHIP contracts. Because coverage of
all services shown in Table 1 are mandatory in Medicaid, no similar comparison is
necessary: whatever might be excluded from the Medicaid contract is covered as a
residual service.145 But the same is not true with SCHIP, since supplemental,
Medicaid-level coverage is an option but is not required. (See Table I Appendix).
Table 1 shows that states that administer separate SCHIP programs do not
report specific coverage of certain aspects of child development services that would
be considered required in Medicaid. For example, only 7 states report coverage of
developmental assessments, only 2, lead screening, and only 1, anticipatory guidance.
In all states, well-baby and well-child care would be covered as a basic SCHIP
benefit, and presumably at least a threshold level of anticipatory guidance would
be part of any well-child encounter between a pediatric health professional and a
parent or caretaker. This same assumption, however, cannot be made about
comprehensive developmental assessments and assessment of elevated levels of
lead in children’s blood, since both interventions are relatively resource intensive,
and in the case of developmental assessments, time consuming. Table 1 also
shows that only 2 state SCHIP plans provide for the type of preventive standard of
medical necessity that is required in the case of Medicaid.
Of great interest however, Table 1 also shows that unlike Medicaid, SCHIP
contracts actually can be broader than states’ SCHIP plans. That is, certain aspects
of developmental interventions that are not covered in a state’s SCHIP plan
nonetheless show up in a contract as an expectation of the managed care
organization. Thus, for example, 7 of the 15 states whose plan and contract elements
are displayed show coverage of developmental assessments in their state plans, yet
10 list developmental assessments as an expectation of their contractors. The same
is true for vision care, immunizations and lead screening, and for medical necessity.
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SCHIP Contracts versus Medicaid Contracts
Table 2 shows that while SCHIP contracts are more expansive than state
SCHIP plans in certain respects, the contracts are less expansive than Medicaid.
Not only is Medicaid coverage broader than SCHIP from a state plan perspective,
but Medicaid agencies are willing to hold their contractors to broader coverage and
management duties than is the case with SCHIP agencies. For example, several
states whose SCHIP contracts specify well-child care nonetheless do not specify
developmental assessments. Very few SCHIP contracts specify lead screening
compared to the Medicaid contracts. Whereas 11 Medicaid contracts build the
program’s preventive definition of medical necessity into the documents, this level
of coverage is specified in only 6 SCHIP contracts. (See Table 2 Appendix).
Connecticut’s and Colorado’s SCHIP contracts show the contrast between
a preventive standard of medical necessity that captures the thrust of the Medicaid
standard, and one that is more consistent with traditional commercial insurance
principles that focus coverage on treatment of defined medical conditions:
Connecticut: “Medically necessary/Medical necessity: Health care provided to correct or diminish
the adverse effects of a medical condition or mental illness; to assist an individual in attaining or
maintaining an optimal level of health; to diagnose a condition or prevent a medical condition
from occurring. . .”146
Colorado: “‘Medically Necessary,’ or ‘Medical Necessity: A Covered Service shall be
deemed Medically Necessary if, in a manner consistent with accepted standards of medical
practice, it is: 1. consistent with the symptom, diagnosis and treatment of a Member’s
medical condition; 2. widely accepted by the practitioner’s peer group as efficacious and
reasonably safe based upon scientific evidence; 3. not Experimental or Investigational; 4.
not solely for cosmetic purposes; 5. not solely for the convenience of the Member, Subscriber,
physician or other provider; 6. the most appropriate level of care that can be safely
provided to the Member; 7. failure to provide the Covered Service would adversely affect
the Member’s health.” 147
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In the case of Connecticut’s contract, a treatment is considered medically
necessary for SCHIP children if (as is the case with Medicaid) the intervention is
aimed at assisting an individual to attain and maintain growth and development or
is designed to prevent a medical condition from occurring.148 In the case of Colorado,
a treatment is considered medically necessary only if aimed at a diagnosable medical
condition (which is not always the case with slowed or delayed development in
children). Furthermore, treatment will be considered necessary only if failure to
furnish the treatment would adversely affect health.149 Failure to respond to a
developmental delay in a child has many adverse consequences, but adverse health
may not be one of them.
Differences between Medicaid and SCHIP contracts go beyond coverage.
Anticipatory care is significantly less common as a specific performance requirement
in SCHIP contracts, as are expectations of continuity of care (related to situations
in which children enrolling in a plan are already under treatment and must be
integrated into a potentially new network), coordination with early intervention
services offered by other public agencies such as state maternal and child health
agencies, and other outreach and child development activities.150 Most strikingly
perhaps, “incentivization” of access and quality is a universal feature of Medicaid
managed care contracts in the case of treatment and management of young children,
but this is not the case in SCHIP contracts.151
Discussion
The SCHIP legislation had two parents. One was widely hailed at the time
of enactment, while the other remained obscured in the face of back patting and
accolades of bipartisanship and health reform. President Clinton, who signed the
1996 welfare law once the Medicaid block grant was removed, extravagantly
proclaimed SCHIP the largest expansion in coverage for children since the original
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enactment of Medicaid.152 This claim, of course, overlooked the doubling of
Medicaid’s pediatric rolls as a result of the legislative expansions during the 1980s.
Praise for SCHIP also helped gloss over the legislation’s more sobering dimensions,
including the loss of the legal entitlement and the elimination of nearly all coverage
rules.153
Indeed, in our view it is not too harsh to argue that in the long run, SCHIP
may do less to help children and families than harm them by helping to further
destabilize the already shaky Medicaid picture. If total destabilization occurs, and
if SCHIP (along with the Bush Administration’s Section 1115 demonstrations) is
any indicator of what the successor program will look like, then there is indeed
much to think about, particularly where the welfare of children and adults with
significant health needs is concerned. With its ability to act as a substitute for
Medicaid even where its benefits are essentially unknown and market-dictated,
SCHIP has been, in some key ways, a warm-up for the Medicare Prescription
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, which completely eliminated
Medicaid prescription drug coverage for so-called “dual enrollees” (arguably
Medicaid’s most sick and most disabled beneficiaries) in favor of a new Medicare
premium support system, whose benefit design is essentially unknown and virtually
entirely in the hands of participating plans.154 Like EPSDT, Medicaid prescription
drug benefits are one of the law’s most comprehensive aspects. With supplemental
Medicaid prescription drug benefits eliminated for dual enrollees, they are, like
SCHIP children with physical and mental disabilities, essentially reliant on the
market’s willingness to customize its products to their needs.155
Of course one critical issue delineates SCHIP from the Medicaid prescription
drug situation. States could have used their authority under SCHIP to duplicate
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Medicaid although at a higher federal match rate.156 Indeed, a number of states did
exactly this rather than establish a separate program.157 But a separate SCHIP
program was the norm, and the states which pursued separate programs did so to
avoid not only legal entitlements, but also, as this study shows, Medicaid-level
comprehensive coverage. Once states were freed of Medicaid’s conditions for
children – an enforceable legal entitlement, defined benefits that extend beyond
the limits of actuarial coverage norms, and the legal obligation to supplement
coverage of managed care plan benefits and services – they expanded coverage
rapidly, but on their terms, and only up to the limits of the federal contributions
they received.158 Indeed, waiting lists have become a feature of state SCHIP
programs.159 Furthermore, in terms of benefit design, separately administered
SCHIP expansions followed the specifications of the actuarial benchmarks specified
in the statute, not the broad concept of coverage envisioned in Medicaid.160 The
difference between the two approaches to pediatric coverage is considerable and
shows up clearly when one examines SCHIP and Medicaid limits using the standards
of care applicable to early intervention programs for young children at risk of
developmental delay.
Much is written in the law and in political and policy essays about “legislative
intent.” There are many instances in which a law must be placed in context before
its textual meaning becomes truly discernible.161 SCHIP is not one of those laws;
its true intent shows up on the face of the text itself, from the explicit assertion that
“nothing in this title shall be construed as providing an individual with an entitlement
to child health assistance,” to the use of a premium support approach to coverage.162
A detailed inspection of both the law and subsequent state implementation
of its provisions confirms what one may have hypothesized might occur during an
era notable for its rush to abandon social welfare entitlements for the poor: in the
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main, states used their SCHIP allotments to extend to low-income children a far
more conventional and limited form of coverage than is possible under Medicaid.
Medicaid reflects an era of public policy support for legal entitlements for
the poor and disenfranchised.163 Medicaid not only established what ultimately has
been interpreted as a federal legal entitlement, but did so in remarkably clear and
broad terms in the case of children. For children, Medicaid coverage operates at a
level which has virtually no parallel in the insurance market. There is no “actuarial
benchmark” for Medicaid.164
SCHIP is a product of a different era. Under programs such as SCHIP,
low-income persons no longer are legally entitled to benefits.165 They receive what
Charles Reich termed “largesse,” up to the limits of fixed aggregate expenditure
caps, and without regard to individual need.166 Furthermore, the design of this
largesse is what the market will bear. As the actuarial benchmark shifts ever downward
in the face of a declining willingness on the part of insurers and group purchasers
to invest in comprehensive coverage, so too, presumably, will SCHIP and similar
benefits for the poor, since their terms of coverage are pegged to the market rather
than objective tests of reasonableness.
At the same time, it is important not to wax overly poetic about Medicaid.
It is essential to remember that the very aspects of Medicaid that make it so
substantively strong for children also have served as its political Achilles Heel. So
disliked is its individually enforceable legal entitlement and the comprehensiveness
of its entitlement terms that states simply refused to take advantage of the program’s
pediatric coverage options.167 Over the past generation, some of the most intense
litigation involving enforcement of federal Medicaid rights has involved children
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and EPSDT; no wonder states have a strong dislike for the program.168 Thus, while
one can mourn the lack of political support for heavily enriched health benefits for
the nation’s poorest children, undifferentiated mourning is not particularly helpful
to the 20-plus million children who stand to lose their Medicaid entitlement if the
program structure is substantially and fundamentally altered, an increasingly likely
reality.169
It is clear that the pediatric health system needs a source of funding with
the flexibility and depth displayed by Medicaid. The evidence regarding the standard
of care for children during early child development and later in life as they develop
special health needs, underscores the need to finance the range of health services
that help achieve optimal growth and development among children.170 There is a
need for child health financing that is unbound by insurance norms and that can
respond to health problems in infancy and childhood which require long-term
interventions in schools and community settings. It is possible to conceptualize a
financing scheme that can supplement what is offered in the private market; indeed,
such an approach can serve as a backstop and a form of “stop loss” by supplementing
the very benefits and services that the insurance market will never realistically confer
on enrollees. This ability to undergird and support insurance products can be seen
in Medicaid supplementation of managed care products for children, and the absence
of such a feature in SCHIP is as serious a problem as SCHIP’s potential to experience
enrollment caps because of under-financing.171
The real question is whether the fundamental mission of Medicaid to support
a broad range of health services for uninsurable populations of all ages can be met
only through an individually enforceable legal entitlement. Clearly the answer to
this question is “no.” In his analysis of health systems in other nations, Timothy
Stoltzfus Jost points out that individually enforceable, legal entitlements are peculiarly
American and that other nations use global budgeting, system support, and
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investments on a population level to achieve adequate levels of resource allocation.172
The key of course is universality.
Thus, at least where children are concerned, a plausible policy option would
be a universal child health insurance program with standard benefits and coverage
rules, coupled with a comprehensive program of state grants to develop and support
systems of care capable of furnishing supplemental child development and family
support services in community settings where they are needed and where they
rightfully should be furnished. Many of the services most needed by children with
nascent – or actual – physical and mental disabilities (and their adult counterparts)
are as much educational or social as they are health care in nature, and optimally the
service is woven into the normal daily life of children in school and at play.173
The critical issue in this plausible option is the universality of the model.
Where only poor children are relegated to benchmark coverage and grant
supplementation, the inevitable result appears to be under-financing.174 Another
way to say this is that, were all children to be covered by SCHIP rather than merely
a slice of low-income uninsured children, mental health benefits never would have
been classified as an “additional” service, dental care would not be non-existent,
and there would not be waiting lists for coverage.175
Perhaps it seems foolish to consider universality at a time of retrenchment
in social policy. On the other hand, the crisis in health care finance now leaves one
in four children dependent on public insurance and fewer than two in five with
employer coverage. If Medicaid is to be fully debated, then there may in fact be no
more appropriate time to abandon backsliding and futile incrementalism in favor
of bold reform, and no more appropriate population on whose behalf to do so.
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